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Network security and its energy efficiency are facing tougher challenges for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
due to emerging purposive strategic internal attacks conducted by smart malicious nodes and unavoidable
external attacks. Most of the current works investigated the group key management for scalability and
efficiency performance in MANETs to defend the external attacks, while some works envisioned the intrusion
detection system or trust management to defend the internal attacks. However, fewer related protocols or
algorithms could combine them well to enhance dual security performance as well as energy efficiency in
MANETs. To this end, we have proposed a novel group key management protocol with high energy efficiency for
the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs, which is provided with three functions to address the issues of improving
security and energy efficiency performance: (1) designing a self-organized group establishing algorithm for strategy
mobile application scenarios to ensure stable groups in spite of users' mobility with reducing the cost of rekeying
operation, (2) proposing a lightweight contributory key agreement and authentication mechanism based on the
group Diffie-Hellman protocol for enhancing global security, and (3) researching a strategic mobile management
mechanism based on the Prufer codec method handling the effect of mobility impacts to enhance the multicast
energy efficiency and provide secret communication among roaming users in MANETs. Both theoretical analyses and
simulation results have demonstrated that our protocol is more energy-efficient for strategy mobile application scenario
of MANETs with a large number of users.
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Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are composed of a
set of mobile nodes wirelessly connected without a
support of any fixed infrastructure. Since MANETs can
be rapidly accessed and flexibly deployed, it has re-
vealed a growth potential in applications such as
battlefield monitoring, disaster recovering, emergency
handling, vehicular networking, etc. These applications
for MANETs have been restricted by their own inher-
ent natures, including constrained available resources,
exposed communication medium, intermittent end-to-
end links, and frequent changes in topology due to
users' mobility, which are all prone to incur various* Correspondence: ee.xiaowang@gzu.edu.cn
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in any medium, provided the original work is pkinds of attacks [1,2]. As a consequence, energy-
efficient and secure group communication must be a
prior concern for MANETs to ease these rigorous se-
curity threats.
To resist internal attacks and preserve energy in
MANETs where mobile users cooperate with each
other in a group to fulfill an assigned task, the object is
to quickly detect the malicious nodes and evict them
from the network. A lot of researches were done in the
past but the most significant contributions were intru-
sion detection system (IDS) techniques [3-5] and trust-
based managements [6-12], but fewer of the protocols
made a decent trade-off between security and perform-
ance if users were in the strategic mobile scenario ofn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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and grab network resources for maximizing attack ef-
fect, some malicious nodes would elaborately choose a
frequency at which they participate in the cooperation
to cheat normal nodes. Consequently, current mali-
cious nodes have changed conventional pure attack
modes into purposive strategic attack modes [13],
such as selective forwarding attack, selfish packet
dropping attack, etc. All these purposive strategic at-
tacks eventually run out of the throughput which re-
sults in network crashes if malicious nodes are not
correctly detected out from the network.
To resist external attacks in distributed group com-
munication networks, an effective way is to use cryp-
tosystems. Among all these issues in MANETs, the
group key management [14-18] is the most critical
one. An algorithm which copes with the establish-
ment, distribution, and maintenance of group keys is
defined as a group key management protocol. Group
key management aiming to enhance security is a very
well-studied investigation in traditional wired net-
works and more recently in MANETs. However, most
existing group key managements designed for trad-
itional wired and wireless networks are not suitable
for MANETs, especially for MANETs used in strategic
mobile application scenarios, because, on the one
hand, most algorithms are lacking a self-organized
grouping mechanism for ensuring the scalability and
performance of key management and, on the other
hand, the effect of mobility causing dynamic topology
changes on energy performance of the algorithms has
not been considered. In this paper, aiming at a strat-
egy mobile application scenario of MANETs, we first
proposed a self-organized group establishing algo-
rithm which only requires users interacting with their
neighbors to let MANETs divide into several groups for
satisfying the scalability. Second, we adopted the con-
tributory key management and designed a highly effi-
cient mobile management model to deal with the
mobile issues when executing group operations. Third,
we provided an efficient multicast mechanism using the
Prufer codec algorithm to achieve the confidential com-
munication among roaming users, which plays a signifi-
cantly important role on cutting down the cost of group
rekeying, improving scalability and efficiency of key
management.
The contributions of our paper are as follows: First,
we propose an online self-organized group establishing
algorithm for strategic mobile scenarios of MANETs to
realize the maneuverability putting the secure group
operation into effect. Second, we design and propose
a lightweight contributory key agreement and authenti-
cation mechanism based on the group Diffie-Hellman
key management protocol in MANETs. Finally, we builda strategic mobile management model based on the
Prufer codec algorithm handling the energy effect of
mobility issues to enhance the multicast efficiency and
provide secret communication among roaming users in
MANETs.
2 Related works
A possible way to resist malicious nodes is to use
behavior-based detection technology performed by
normal network nodes through overhearing the com-
munication in their neighborhood. This leverages the
open broadcast nature of wireless communication. A
popular instantiation of this technology is trust man-
agement approach in MANETs. The issue of trust in
MANETs has been looked at by many researchers
[6-11]. They usually use mathematical methods like the
Dempster-Shafer belief theory for incorporating sec-
ondhand information (reports by other nodes) to cre-
ate a reputation score of a node. Many reputation/
trust-based approaches [10] suffer from poor protec-
tion against ballot stuffing or bad mouthing, which can
be conducted as complex purposed strategic attacks by
the smart malicious nodes we referred previously. The
trust-based approaches are susceptible to behavior
where a node functions correctly but provides wrong
information about another node. Moreover, the ap-
proaches can suffer from non-convergent behavior,
whereby the reputation of a good node gets stuck at a
low value or that of a malicious node is falsely elevated.
Moreover, in realistic MANETs, since the topologies
change dynamically because of node movement, the
trust management approach as well as the wider class
of behavior-based detection cannot detect combination
attacks. Additionally, they often mistakenly detect and
isolate a legitimate member. Thus, how to properly
model attack modes under imperfect monitoring and
identify purposive strategic malicious attacks are still
expected to be solved.
Some recent works [19-22] have studied the detec-
tion of such purposive strategic attack modes. Khalil
and Bagchi [20] modeled similar kinds of purposive
strategic attack models as stealth attacks which con-
tain a suite of four attacks, including misrouting,
power control, identity delegation, and colluding col-
lision for wireless ad hoc networks. Then they pro-
posed a protocol, SADEC, which could detect and
isolate stealthy packet dropping attack efficiently.
SADEC put forward two techniques that can be overlaid
on baseline local monitoring: making the neighbors
maintain additional information about the routing path
and adding certain checking responsibility to each neigh-
bor. In [21], an algorithm based on the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test was investigated to detect malicious
nodes without any priori knowledge. The algorithm
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the cooperative decision and the non-cooperative deci-
sions. However, these works could not make a decent
trade-off between security and energy consumption and
were not suitable for the strategic mobile scenario of
MANETs.
In MANETs, the energy performance is signifi-
cantly degraded as the scale of the network grows.
For enhancing scalability, little work researches both
security and self-organized performance issues of
group establishing algorithm for MANETs. In [23], a
grouping algorithm called MobHid, which guarantees
longer lifetime of the group structure, was proposed.
The mechanism was that it accurately predicts the
mobility of each mobile host based on the stability of
its neighborhood. This information is then used for es-
tablishing each group from hosts that will remain
neighbors for a sufficiently long time, ensuring the for-
mation of groups that are highly resistant to host mo-
bility. In [24], two grouping algorithms were proposed
to find the weakly connected dominating set (WCDS)
for grouping the wireless ad hoc networks. One is a
centralized approximation algorithm called DLA-CC
based on distributed learning automata (DLA) for
searching a near-optimal solution to the minimum
WCDS problem. The other is a DLA-based algorithm
called DLA-DC for grouping the wireless ad hoc net-
works which is a distributed implementation of DLA-
CC. Using DLA-DC, the dominator nodes and their
closed neighbors assume the role of the group man-
agers and group members, respectively. In [25], a local-
ized learning automata-based clustering algorithm
called LLACA for wireless ad hoc networks was pro-
posed. The proposed clustering method is a fully dis-
tributed algorithm in which each node chooses its
group manager based solely on local information re-
ceived from neighbors. For enhancing the security of
the grouping algorithm, a trust-oriented grouping
scheme was proposed [14]. The authors showed that
trust is a relevant grouping criterion which could be
extended to use for enforcing authentication and could
be easily disseminated by the mobility of nodes in
MANETs.
Several recent works investigated the group key
management for scalability and energy efficiency per-
formance in MANETs as in [15-18,26,27]. In [15],
Zhu et al. studied the flexibility and scalability of
dealing with risks in the practical usage of ad hoc net-
works and proposed a hierarchical scheme based on
threshold cryptography to address both security and
efficiency of key management in MANETs. In [16],
Cho et al. proposed a scalable and efficient group key
management protocol for secure group communica-
tions in MANETs and identified the optimal settingsof the key management protocol to minimize the net-
work traffic as well as to efficiently balance inter-
group vs. intra-regional group key management over-
heads. Based on it, in [17], Cho et al. integrated the
above group key management protocol with intrusion
detection to handle both outsider and insider security
attacks for group communication systems (GCSs) in
MANETs. Aiming to improve both scalability and sur-
vivability of group key management for large-scale
MANETs, in [18], Huang and Medhi presented a se-
cure group key management scheme for hierarchical
MANETs, which contains a multilevel security archi-
tecture based on the Bell-LaPadula model and a
decentralized group key management infrastructure.
However, their works assumed a fixed group size or
allocated an optimal group size without considering
an online self-organized grouping mechanism for effi-
cient performance. Further, the effect of mobility
causing dynamic topology changes on energy per-
formance of the algorithms has not been considered
well. It is not suitable for MANETs where users are in
strategy mobile application scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, fewer existing works
consider the combination of group key management
with high scalability, energy efficiency, and survivable
group communication system in MANETs. In addition, to
build a strategic mobile management model based on
the Prufer codec algorithm handling the effect of mobil-
ity issues, our work is the first that considers the strat-
egy mobile application scenarios for MANETs and
designs an online self-organized group establishing al-
gorithm of such scenarios to enhance the maneuver-
ability putting the secure group operation in MANETs
into effect.
3 Preliminary
3.1 Group establishing algorithm for strategic mobile
scenario in MANETs
3.1.1 Strategic mobile scenario in MANETs
In the real MANET application scenes, the mobile
properties of nodes can be classified into two types.
The first one is called random mobile, such as vehicle-
mounted mobile communication, wildlife monitoring,
etc. Since the mobile paradigm and direction are un-
predictable which may lead to a frequent rekeying
process, it will cost too much energy if a contributory
key agreement protocol is adopted. The second one is
strategy mobile, such as battlefield monitoring, com-
munity mobile terminal tracking and networking, etc.
The mobile of nodes is aimed at pursuing more com-
munication links and more robust quality of commu-
nication services, that is to say, the probability of
keeping moving on for a node which owns more stable
links is lower than that for one with less stable links.
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quality of communication links have so much influ-
ence on the mobile attribute of nodes. The more the
neighbor nodes are, the more reliable the communica-
tion quality is; hence, the probability of tending to be
stable is greater and vice versa. In this paper, we
mainly investigate and propose a group establishing
algorithm among users in such strategic mobile sce-
nario of MANETs.3.1.2 The design principle of group establishing algorithm
in strategic mobile scenario
Firstly, it is necessary to propose an algorithm to
adaptively detect the number of neighbor nodes and
communication quality around each user. On the
basis of our previous research, we have put forward
an approach of quality prediction and detection for
adaptive links based on time slots [28]. With the help
of this approach, the MANET topology and link
quality can be accurately calculated within one time
slot.
Secondly, the group establishing algorithm must fol-
low the principle of self-organization for strategic mo-
bile scenario. To this end, our algorithm will locally
elect the group manager (i.e. GM for short) who is re-
sponsible for the establishment, distribution, and
management of group keys; thus, the mobile state of
the GM has to be relatively stable. Through establish-
ing groups for users in the strategic mobile scenario of
MANETs, there are more high-quality links between
the members of the local group than between the
users of other groups.
Thirdly, group establishing is the premise and foun-
dation of group key management. In consideration of
the resource constraints of MANET users, the group
establishing algorithm should attempt to avoid fre-
quent interaction among users and rapidly organize
the mass mobile users into several communication




i =Den ið Þ Open set of neighbors of nod
ai The number of neighbors of n
Gi The ID number of GM which
mGi The ID number of GM which
BoolPi Denotes the state that node i
Pointer Si Points to one of node i's ne
Pointer Li Points to a certain node whicFinally, the maintenance and updating of groups
should satisfy the scalability of MANETs, i.e., the in-
crease of users cannot exhaust storage and computation
resources which results in performance crashes of re-
lated protocols during runtime.3.1.3 Group establishing algorithm
3.1.3.1 Group rule Table 1 lists the notations used in
this section.
We model the MANET topology as T(U, L), where
U is the set of all nodes and L is the set of com-
munication links. For arbitrary ui ∈ U(i = 1, 2,⋯, n),
we define the open set of neighbor nodes as Nopenu ¼
v u; vf g∈Lgjf and correspondingly we define the close
set as Ncloseu ¼ Nopenu ∪ uf g . The density of node u is ob-
tained by modulus operation as Den uð Þ ¼ Nopenu
  , i.e.,
the number of neighbors of node u. In our definition, all
eligible groups constitute the set represented as G = {G1,
G2,⋯, Gs}, and it must simultaneously satisfy the following
three conditions:
1. {G1} ∪ {G2} ∪ ⋯ ∪ {Gs} =U;
2. ∀i,j = 1, 2,⋯, s and i ≠ j, {Gi} ∩ {Gj} =Φ;
3. ∀u∈Gi i ¼ 1; 2; ⋯; sð Þ; Ncloseu ∩Gi
 ≥ Nopenu ∩ U−Gið Þ :
The above group conditions demonstrate that the
number of communication links among all the mem-
bers in any group is not less than that between the
members in this group and other members out of this
group.3.1.3.2 Functions To describe our group establishing al-
gorithm, we first introduce the following required
functions:
Function 1: the minimum density set function Dmin(S),
where S is the input as well as the subset of set U, i.e., S
∈ U; the output of Dmin(S) is one certain element of S
satisfying the following equation:e i/closed set of neighbors of node i/density of node i
ode i which are in the same group with node i
node i belongs to
node i is ready to join
must change another group to meet the group condition
ighbors which is invited to join the group which node i belongs to
h node i accepts its invitation and agrees to join its group
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Function 2: the maximum density set function Dmax(S),
where S is the input as well as the subset of set U, i.e., S ∈ U;
the output of Dmax(S) is one certain element of S satisfying
the following equation:
Dmax Sð Þ ¼ i ∈ Swhen ∀j ∈ S; Den ið Þ > Den jð ÞDen ið Þ ¼ Den jð Þ if i < j

Function 3: the group condition function Gcon(i):
In order to check whether the mentioned group con-
ditions are satisfied around the neighbors of node i,
the function Gcon(i) is defined to output the smallest
ID number of such eligible group's GM. If there are
no eligible groups around the neighbors of node i,
the function would return null. The detailed math-
ematical description is shown as follows:
Gcon ið Þ ¼ j if u ∈ N
open
i ;Gu ¼ j
  ≥ u ∈ Nopeni ;Gu≠j  
null if a group does not exist

Function 4: the GM decision function GM(i) whose
aim is to search the eligible group manager among
node i and its neighbors. The input of GM(i) is the
ID of node i and it outputs the ID of such eligible
GM. If there is no appropriate GM, the function
returns null. The pseudo-codes of function 4 are shown
as follows:
According to our group rules, for the strategy mobile
nodes in MANETs, the group establishment will be
completed when the condition ∀i ∈ U, Gcon(i) = Gi ≠
null is true.3.1.3.3 Description of the group establishing algorithm
The pseudo-codes are as follows:
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ology for instance to explain the process of our group
establishing algorithm in detail. Briefly, there are 12
nodes implementing the strategy mobile application in
MANETs. Each node runs the link quality detection al-
gorithm to be aware of its neighbor table which contains
members keeping up relatively stable correspondence
with itself. Then members exchange IDs with each other.
Finally, the real-time topology of MANETs is built as
shown in Figure 1a.The implementation of our algorithm can be generally
divided into the following phases:
A. Initialization phase: Each node runs Den(i) to
calculate its own density and exchanges this
information with neighbors (as shown in Figure 1a,
where one certain node is denoted by circles
including its ID number, and its calculated density
value is labeled nearby the circle). Firstly, the relative
grouping variables and pointers of all nodes are set to
null. Then each node is going to run through every
test function (i.e., from Test1() to Test6()) by
executing Check() until all the established groups are
eligible under the defined rules.
B. GM establishment and neighbor invitation phase:
After initialization, all nodes will accomplish the
GM establishment by means of executing GM(i)
when running through the Test1(). As shown in
Figure 1b, node 3 and node 10 declare themselves
GM for satisfying the defined GM condition. Then
every GM executes Check() to traverse each test
function for inviting enough neighbors to meet the
group condition. For GM3, it runs Test2() and
invites its neighbor whose density is the smallest
(i.e., node 2) to join the group according to Si ¼ Dmin
j j∈Nopeni ;Gj≠Gi; Lj ¼ nullgÞ
 . Similarly, for GM10,
its neighbors, nodes 8, 11, and 12, are invited into
group 10 by multiple execution of Test2(). For nodes 4
and 5, which connect to different GMs (i.e., GM3 and
GM10), they execute GM(i) when running through
Test1() to choose the GM with the greatest density
(see Dmax j∈N
open
i ;Gj ¼ j
 
) as their GM and join this
group (i.e., nodes 4 and 5 join group 3). After all, GM3
and GM10 have invited and recruited enough
neighbors according to ai ≥ Den(i) − ai, and this
phase is finished.
C. Exterior/edge member joining stage: The remainder
nodes which have not been invited (i.e., nodes 1, 6,
7, 9) execute Check() to run through each test
function and choose the appropriate conditions to
join the existing group. As shown in Figure 1c, we
can see that node 1 joins group 3 by calculating the
group condition function Gcon(1) = 3 and executing
Test1() and Test3(). In the same way, nodes 6 and 7
also join group 3 by calculating Gcon(6) =Gcon(7) = 3
and executing Test1() and Test3().
D. Group completion stage: In the above stage, for node
9, the group condition function satisfies Gcon(9) =
null when nodes 6 and 7 have not yet joined group 3.
At this moment, by executing Test1(), it still cannot
determine the affiliation of node 9 due to the result
G9 =Gcon(9) = null. Therefore, in this phase, it will
continue the ergodic operation to settle the




Figure 1 Grouping implementation. (a) Initialization phase. (b) GM establishment and neighbor invitation phase. (c) Exterior/edge member
joining stage. (d) Group completion stage.
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operation, node 9 finally determines its affiliation
(i.e., group 3). So far, all the members satisfy the
terminal condition ∀i ∈ U, Gcon(i) = Gi ≠ null
and the groups for MANET secret communica-
tion are established successfully.
The above group establishing algorithm applied in
MANETs with strategic mobile scenario has the follow-
ing advantages:
1. The mobile nodes or users are divided into several
communication groups in a self-organizing manner.
It does not rely on a centralized server to deploy the
relative grouping parameters in advance. What is
more, each node only needs to interact with its own
neighbors rather than maintain the information of
other groups. Consequently, as the user number
increases and the scale of group enlarges, each user
still maintains the information and data processing
within its own single and adjacent groups, which
serve the needs of self-organization and scalability
for MANETs.
2. According to the strategy mobile application
scenario, when a user detects more high quality
communication links, its movement state tends to
be stable, i.e., the probability of large-scale stochastic
move is relatively low. Under our group establishingalgorithm, the user which has the greatest number
of high-quality links is most likely to be a GM. As a
matter of fact, GM needs to invite (or recruit) sufficient
members to satisfy the group requirements designed
for strategic mobile scenario; therefore, the majority
of those members who share the high quality links
with the GM could essentially be recruited to form a
group. The probability of the GM and its neighbors of
forming of the core region in one group and generating
tremendous movement is relatively low. This advantage
lays the foundation for reducing the energy
consumption and communication overhead during
the key updating and maintenance in MANETs.
3. Through executing the algorithm, the members in
the edge region of one group are those with lower
densities compared to those in the core region. As a
result, the users in the edge region are most likely to
generate the wide movement. We only pay more
attention to implement the mobile management for
users in the edge region of one group when
designing our group key management protocol.
Naturally, it will effectively reduce the resource
consumption of design and maintenance for
protocols.
3.2 Diffie-Hellman group key management
We adopt the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem as the way
of key exchange. Let G want be a finite multiplicative
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known discrete logarithm (DL) problem is believed to be
intractable, and let g be a generator of G. Also consider
a hash function H: {0, 1}*→ Zq .
Assume that multimembers are denoted by set {Ni| i =1,
2,…, n}, and GM wants to negotiate a shared key. They per-
form the following steps:
 Each member Ni chooses a random private
ephemeral key ri ∈ Zq and calculates the blind
version gri to GM.
 The GM raises each received version to its own
private ephemeral key rm and broadcasts them along
with the original contributions to the group, i.e., it
sends {gri, gri rm} for all i = 1, 2,…, n.
Then each member i checks if its contribution is
included correctly, removes its private ephemeral key for
i = {1, 2,…, n} to get grm, and computes the shared key of
the group as shown by the following:









3.3 Strategic mobile management
When designing an appropriate key management proto-
col for MANETs, it should be well considered for the
following two aspects. On the one hand, it needs to
adopt the approach of distributed group key manage-
ment, i.e., the users are divided into multiple groups and
the procedures of key establishment, distribution, and
maintenance are executed only within each group. On
the other hand, the dynamics of MANET topology and
node mobility must be considered to put rekeying and
maintaining into effect. Therefore, the design of a highly
efficient mobile management among users plays a sig-
nificantly important role in cutting down the cost of
group rekeying, improving the scalability and efficiency
of key management.
In the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs, since
nodes in the edge region are more likely to move than
those in the core region, we mainly focus on investigat-
ing the mobile management method for nodes in edge
regions. The ID numbers of mobile nodes in a certain
edge region which move to another group are coded and
decoded by using the Prufer codec method. And they
are managed by the involved GMs. Thus, it is unneces-
sary to restart the rekeying process once nodes in the
edge region of a group move to other adjacent groups. It
only requires the involved GMs to manage the mobilityof roaming nodes, which can carry out high efficiency of
key management for MANETs.
4 Group key management
In this section, we mainly present our group key man-
agement for the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs
which relies on the aforementioned grouping algorithm
and DH method. Notice that each node is pre-loaded
a unique ID number and a uniform Hash function in
advance.
4.1 Group architecture and establishment
Through running the group establishing algorithm de-
signed in the previous section, all users in MANETs are
divided into multiple groups. Based on them, shown in
Figure 2, we first describe the group architecture in this
section.
Each communication group is composed of a GM and
several group members Mi(i = 1, 2,⋯, n). The group
members with one direct hop link to GM are defined as
group backbone nodes (GBN). The member nodes
which simultaneously bridge two or more GMs with one
hop are called network bridges (NBs). Therefore, those
groups connected by NBs are defined as adjacent groups.
Note the transitivity property of adjacency relationship
in our group architecture, i.e., if group G10 is adjacent
to G3, meanwhile G3 is adjacent to G13, and then G10
and G13 are still regarded as adjacent groups. The set of
all groups maintaining the same adjacent relationship is
defined as adjacency field (AF) in our group architecture.
Different AFs are distinguished by different subscript
numbers, such as AF1, AF2, and so on.
There are three kinds of group keys in our proposed
key management protocol. They are group session key
KGi , adjacency field key KAF, and mobile management
key KAFmob . Specifically, KGi , shared by the GM and its
member nodes, is used for secret information broad-
cast and multihop transmission in this group. KAF is
shared by all GMs and NBs residing in one adjacency
field. It is used for adjacency information interaction
and mobile management. KAFmob is jointly generated by
all GMs in the same AF and distributed to all nodes in
this AF. KAFmob is used for roaming nodes to transmit secret
information between the host group and original group.
4.2 Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) key management
4.2.1 Key establishment
4.2.1.1 Establishment of group session key (KGi ) As
shown in Figure 3, group session key is calculated by
contributive agreement approaches such as GDH, which
means all member nodes in the same group contribute
to the computation of group session key. This protocol
needs only two communication rounds to compute KGi
Figure 2 Group architecture.
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the following two steps:
Step1: Each member Mi of group Gs generates a
random number ri ∈ Zq and calculates the version






Step2: The group manager MGi authenticates the
ID of Mi and raises the received Ni generated by Mi
to its own random version Nc ¼ grc modnf g . Then
MGi broadcasts them along with the original contri-
butions to the group, for example, it sends the new
blinded factor Nci ¼ Nið Þrc modn ¼ grcri modn
 
to








Then each Mi checks if its contribution is included cor-
rectly. After authenticating the packet, Mi removes gri
from Nci ¼ Nið Þrc mod n ¼ grcri mod n
 
to obtain grc .
All member nodes of group manager MGi compute the
shared key KGi of this group as shown by following:









4.2.1.2 Establishment of adjacency field key (KAF)
Once all of the group session keys in a certain AF are
established, then the establishment of adjacency field key
can be generated. The establishment of KAF is launched
by the GM which owns most NBs in one AF. If there are
GMs which have the same number of NBs, the GM with
the smallest ID number will be in charge for launching
the KAF establishment procedure. As shown in Figure 4,
node 3 is in charge of the establishment of KAF1.
Step 1: The GM which is responsible for the establish-
ment of KAF (adjacency field manager (AFM)) sends the
key establishment request (AF key establishment re-
quest) to all the NBs of its neighbors, and the NBs for-
ward this request to the rest of the GMs of the adjacent
groups. The GMs of the adjacent groups which receive
the request forward it to the rest of the NBs to spread
until all the GMs in the AF receive the request.
Step 2: Each group manager MGi which received the
establishment request of this adjacency field generates
a random number rAFi ∈Z

q and calculates the version
Figure 4 Establishment of adjacency field key.





. Then MGi sends N
AF
i to its AFM
MAFMi through the collaborative forwarding among this










Step 3: The AFM MAFMi authenticates the ID of MGi
and raises the received NAFi generated by MGi to its own




. Then MAFMi broad-
casts the raised result along with the original contributions
to the group manager, for example, it sends the new blinded
factor NAFijc ¼ NAFi
 rAFc mod n ¼ grAFi rAFc mod nn o to MGi
















Then eachMGi checks if its contribution is included cor-
rectly. After authenticating the packet, MGi removes g
rAFi
from NAFijc ¼ NAFi
 rAFc modn ¼ grAFi rAFc modnn o to obtain
gr
AF
c . All GMs MGi as well as AFM MAFMi in this AF com-















4.2.1.3 Establishment of mobile management key (KAFmob)
In our key management protocol, when a node of low
density roams from the original group to its adjacentgroup in order to detect more effective links, our object-
ive is to realize the secure communication between
roaming node and its original group without updating
the group session key. To this end, it mainly depends on
the mobile management using KAFmob.
After establishing KAFi of one certain AFi, all GMs in
AFi can directly calculate by a hash function.
Step 1: The adjacency field manager MAFMi generates an
initial value f of a fresh counter and sends it to all group
mangers MGi of this adjacency field encrypted by KAFi






Step 2: The group manager MGi decrypts the packet
and checks if both of the IDs of MAFM i and MGi are em-
bedded correctly. After authenticating the packet, the
group manager MGi obtains f and computes the mobile
management key KAFimob ¼ MAC KAFi ; fð Þ of the adjacency
field and disseminates it to all the members of its own










Then every member of the adjacency field could share
the mobile management key KAFimob securely.
4.2.2 Group key updating
In traditional group key management protocols for
MANETs, it often requires frequent key updating for the
purpose of guaranteeing the security of key protocol,
which primarily refers to the forward and backward se-
curity and the ability against malicious attacks. Even
though taking periodical rekeying scheme, once group
topology changes due to the roam of members, it will
launch the extra key updating procedure. What is more,
consider the following situations: 1) Some legal nodes
cannot be detected by their companions in one group
because of the dramatic drop of the surrounding com-
munication quality in just a very short time. 2) Some
legal nodes roam randomly in a certain range which re-
sults for nodes to leave the group at some moment but
return to the group at the next moment, etc.
The above two cases are deemed as group topology
changes. Once they happen, the GM launches the group
key updating process and distributes the new shared key
to all the remaining members. If these leaving members
return to the original group after a short period of time,
they would be treated as new members joining the
group. Therefore, the GM will launch the group key
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member which roams back and forth across the group
border, or is out of touch not due to its hardware fault,
is kind of a legal node, it is unnecessary to waste lots of
communication and computation overhead for rekeying
in the abovementioned situations.
In order to reduce the frequency of the unnecessary
key updating in the strategic mobile scenario of MAN-
ETs, our proposed protocol divides the MANETs into
the core region and edge region. The core region of a
group consists of members with high density and the
backbone nodes (backbone nodes are the collection of
nodes with higher density and own the dominant num-
ber of high-quality communication link inside this
group), while the edge region of the group is composed
of members with relatively lower density which may
generate wide movements with a larger probability. In
addition, we define the adjacency field cascading two or
more groups with more interactive links. To this end, on
the one hand, users with more communication links and
lower mobile probability are gathered together to reduce
the possibility of rekeying in one group. On the other
hand, the mobile management model, described in detail
in Section 4.2.3, for users in edge regions of one AF en-
sure that the nodes will still be able to realize confiden-
tial communication with the original group without
updating the session key when they depart from the ori-
ginal group but still in the adjacency region. To sum up,
in our protocol, the corresponding group key updating
procedure will be triggered when the following situations
occur:
1. It will perform the key updating process once the
default updating cycle is triggered.
2. When mobile nodes voluntarily leave the original
group to join the new group (i.e., sending a
leaving request) or when the mobile nodes roam
to the outside of their adjacent field and are
detected in other AFs, which leads to the
essential changes of the group members, it will
perform the key updating process.
3. When a node fails and cannot be repaired within a
certain time, or when the edge region nodes (or
backbone nodes) roam to the outside of their
adjacent field, the GMs will not be able to locate the
roaming nodes in the AF by means of the mobile
management model. Thereby, it will perform the key
updating process.
4. When the large-scale movement happens to the
GMs or their backbone members, which causes
the disruption of the group structure, the group
establishing algorithm would be re-executed to
construct new group architectures. As aconsequence, various types of keys in our proto-
col will be updated after completing the group-
ing procedure.
4.2.3 Secure communication among roaming nodes
4.2.3.1 Strategic mobile management in adjacency
field In this section, we will describe our strategic mo-
bile management model within the adjacency field. The
goal of this model is to provide the relay services and
mobile management for roaming nodes and the original
GM to realize the confidential communication, which is
achieved by multibroadcasting technology using a position
table built and maintained by all GMs and NBs in the adja-
cency field. The model is described in detail as follows:
A. When the member MOrii (probable in the edge region
of the original group) of a group takes the strategy mobile
scheme to move into the other group but still in its adja-
cent field, it generates the following packet (Hello packet)
to detect links and interact with members of a new group











where IDMOriGi is the ID number of the original group
manager and IDMOriGi is the ID number of the mobile
node. The Hello packet is encrypted with adjacent field
mobile management key.
B. After the new group member MNewGj receives the
Hello packet, it decrypts the packet with KAFsmob to obtain
IDMOriGi and IDMiOriG . Then M
NewG
j sends an ACK to in-
form MOrii the ID number of this new group manager,











If the number of the ACK received from the new
group by MOrii is greater than the link number of the ori-
ginal group, MOrii will reside in the new group at a larger
probability. To this effect, MOrii sends the resident
request to MNewGj as follows (residing does not mean
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where IDMNewGi is the ID number of the new group
manager.
C. After receiving the reside request sent by MOrii ,
MNewGj decrypts it with K
AFs
mob and verifies the involved
ID numbers. Once they are authenticated successfully,
MNewGj sends the information of the resident mobile node
as well as its group information encrypted with the session
key of the new group to GM (if it does not communicate
directly with the GM, the packet can be forwarded to





∥MAC Mob∥EKNewGj IDMNewGj ∥IDMOriGi∥IDMOriGi
n o 	
where IDMNewGj is the ID number of the new group mem-
ber which receives the Hello packet.
D. After executing the above three steps, all roaming
nodes residing in the new groups of the same AF estab-
lish the relationship with the GMs of the new groups.
All group managers in this AF share and maintain a pos-
ition table storing each resident roaming node's location
through spreading it by NBs (in this case, it requires to
encrypt the information of the position table using the
adjacent field key). If the resident information changes,
it has to update the position table in time so as to realize
the strategy mobile management within the AF.
4.2.3.2 Construction of secure multicast path among
roaming nodes using the Prufer codec method If the
GM needs to launch secret sessions within its group
members, in addition to communicating with members
still staying in the group, the GM has to search for
roaming members residing in another group of the AF
through the mobile management model described in the
previous section. Then the GM could transmit confiden-
tial information to those members by means of relay for-
warding responded by the involved GMs and NBs.
A traditional method of routing messages to objective
roaming members is the way of flooding. However, the
implementation of this method not only consumes toomuch intermediate nodes' energy but also generates a
great number of redundant packets which results in con-
suming lots of bandwidth and inducing delay.
In order to launch the secure communication to target
host group managers, a communication-efficient multi-
cast path is required. In our scheme, we present a multi-
cast path construction scheme based on the Prufer
codec method. Using the Prufer codec method, we can
significantly reduce the multicast's complexities in terms
of both communication overhead and storage overhead.
Specifically, a secure communication path calculated by
using the topology-aware routing protocols for ad hoc
[29,30] is created and encoded to the Prufer sequence.
This secure communication path, from the original
group manager to the target group manager, can be ob-
tained by computing a minimum cost multicast tree,
commonly known as the Steiner tree. Then we convert
this tree into the Prufer sequence and embed it in the
confidential packet for multicast, which is equivalent to
multicasting the packet to multiple targets over a multihop
network. Hence, this packet can be transmitted purpose-
fully to the target group according to the Prufer sequence
along the tree path instead of flooding diffusion.
In this section, the Prufer codec algorithm will be intro-
duced first, i.e., how to convert a tree into the sequence
information (encoding) and how to recover this unique
tree by means of sequence transforming (decoding). Then
we will illustrate a secret session instance between the
roaming member and original group by using our key
management protocol and secure communication codec-
based multicast.
4.2.3.2.1 The Prufer codec method Suppose that there
is a tree T denoted as {v1, v2,⋯, vn}, where vi(i = 1, 2,⋯)
represents the vertex of this tree (i.e., the MANET nodes
in the tree). The value of vi indicates the ID number of
the node. Edge(vi,vj) is the link that connects nodes vi
and vj.
1. The Prufer encoding algorithm
 If vi is a leaf node of tree T with the smallest ID
number and vj directly connects vi, i.e., Edge(vi,vj)
exists. Then put vj into the Prufer sequence
represented as PS.
 Remove vi and Edge(vi, vj) from tree T.
 Go back to step 1 and re-execute the steps until
only one edge remains in tree T. Then the
sequence PS has been built successfully and put
the remaining nodes of tree T into the other
sequence represented as RPS (remaining of the
Prufer sequence) in ascending order by their ID
number.
2. The Prufer decoding algorithm
Fig
(c)
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respectively (assume that they are vi and vj) and
recover an edge Edge(vi,vj) of tree T.
 Remove vi and vj from RPS and PS, respectively.
After that if vj does not exist in PS, then put it
into RPS with a proper place (arrange the ID
number in ascending order).
 Go back to step 1 and re-execute the steps until
there is no element in PS. At this moment, there
are two remaining elements in RPS. Then recover
the edge composed of these two remainder
elements of tree T. So far, the whole tree T is
successfully restored from PS and RPS.4.2.3.2.2 Communication instance Assume a typical
application in MANETs with strategic mobile scenario.
Firstly, running the group establishing algorithm, users
are divided into multiple adjacency fields and eligible(a)
(b)
ure 5 Secret communication instance. (a) An example of adjacency f
Computation of the minimum-cost tree (Steiner tree).groups according to our group rules. After that, the ses-
sion key, adjacency field key, and mobile management
key are established with a fewer rounds and lower latency
through the previous key establishing procedure.
Take a certain adjacency field as an example repre-
sented in Figure 5a; there are five groups in AF1, where
nodes marked yellow are members of group 3. Due to
strategy mobile, members 1, 2, and 8 of group 3 roam to
other groups and detect more links. They choose to res-
ide in group 6, group 13, and group 10, respectively, in
AF1. GM3 together with GM6, GM11 and GM13 of AF1
creates and maintains a common position table which
contains the above resident information by means of the
mobile management model. If GM3 wants to communi-
cate with its member nodes, it will query this table to
get the resident information of its members in AF1. Get-
ting back to this instance, it will learn that group 6,
group 13, and group 10 are the target groups. In addition,(c)
ield. (b) Real-time dynamic topology of the GMs and NBs in AF1.
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real-time dynamic topology of the GMs and NBs in AF1 is
perceived as shown in Figure 5b. Next, according to the
target groups {6, 13, 10}, using the method [31,32], the
minimum-cost tree (Steiner tree) can be computed, which
is shown in Figure 5c. Finally, GM 3 converts this tree into
sequence by the Prufer codec method and embeds it into
multicast packet transmitting to the target users.
We describe the Prufer encoding procedure in detail
as follows: Firstly, node 6 is the leaf node with the smal-
lest ID number. Since Edge(6,4) is an edge of the tree,
put node 4 into to PS (PS = {4}). Then node 6 and Edge
(6,4) are removed from the tree. Secondly, node 4
becomes the leaf node with the smallest ID number
and Edge(4,3) is also an edge. Thus, put node 3 into
PS (PS = {4,3}) and remove node 4 and Edge(4,3)
from the tree. Similarly, the above process is repeated
until there is only one edge in the tree. Finally, the
two sequences, PS = {4,3,15,7,3,14,11} and RPS = {6,10,13}
are computed successfully. After that, GM3 generates the
following multicast packet encrypted by KAF1 and sends it



















where the multicast packet includes multicast frame
header, PS, and RPS encrypted with KAF1mob and the confi-
dential original group data encrypted with the session
key of group 3, i.e., KG3 .
After the involved NBs receive the multicast packets,
they decrypt the packet by KAF1mob to obtain PS and RPS,
and it will restore the minimum-cost tree through the
Prufer decoding algorithm as follows: Firstly, take out the
first element from RPS (i.e., node 6) and PS (i.e., node 4)
to recover an edge Edge(6,4) of the tree. Then remove
node 4 from RPS, and similarly remove node 6 from
PS. Since node 4 does not exist in PS, put node 4 into
RPS with a proper place. At this moment, PS equals
{3,15,7,3,14,11} and RPS equals {4,10,13}. Secondly,
node 4 and node 3 are taken out, respectively, form
RPS and PS to recover an edge Edge(4,3) of the tree
and then they are removed from corresponding se-
quences. As node 3 still exists in PS, it will not be put
into the RPS. Right now, PS equals {15,7,3,14,11} and
RPS equals {10,13}. Similarly, in the next phase, Edge
(10,15) is recovered, and PS changes to {7,3,14,11} and
RPS changes to {13,15}. With the continuousimplementation of the decoding algorithm, Edge(13,7),
Edge(7,3), Edge(3,14), and Edge(14,11) are successively
recovered. As a consequence, there is no element in PS
and RPS that equals {11,15}. Finally, these two ele-
ments in RPS are taken out to recover the last edge
Edge(15,11) of the tree. So far, the minimum tree is re-
stored successfully. The different nodes of the tree take
different measures to the multicast packet according to
the following rules:
1. If a node, which is included in the initial PS but not
in the target group (i.e., {6, 13, 10}), receives the
multicast packet (i.e., 4, 3), it should forward the
packet directly.
2. If a node, which is neither in the target group {6, 13, 10}
nor in the initial PS, receives the multicast packet
(i.e., 5, 12), it should discard the packet directly.
3. If a node, which does not belong to the initial PS but
belongs to the target ({6, 13, 10}) receives the
multicast packet, it should process the packet as
follows: It first extracts EKG3
0GroupData0f g and
IDMG3 from the multicast packet, then builds a new
secret packet as follows. The packet is encrypted by
KAF1mob and sent to the target roaming nodes (in this
example, node 6 processes the multicast packet and










In the above communication instance, without updat-
ing the original group session key, the members generat-
ing strategy roaming scheme are still able to maintain
confidential communication with the original group in
the adjacent field by means of mobile management and
efficient multicast. It can effectively reduce the energy
cost and improve the efficiency of multicast, which is
suitable for MANET environment, especially for the
MANETs under the strategic mobile scenario.
5 Performance analyses
5.1 Attack model and security countermeasures
Generally speaking, an attacker would strive to obtain
authorized access and then implement as an internal at-
tacker. First, we briefly introduce feasible external attack
models and our countermeasures by using group key man-
agement. An external attacker can obtain unauthorized
access to a legitimate field by eavesdropping packets or
any message embedding various keys for more advanced
attacks. We adopt independent rekeying at three different
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bile management key) to guarantee the network confiden-
tiality. An external attacker can also try to modify the
packets to break their integrity. We use a contributory key
(the group key) shared by only legitimate group members
to guarantee the data integrity. An external attacker might
pretend a legitimate group member to join a group. We
have each node pre-loaded with a hash function to ensure
every message's authenticity by message authentication
code (MAC) and prevent potential impersonation attacks
during the authentication process of a new member’s join-
ing. Active external attacks such as denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks can also be mitigated by MAC. An external
attacker may forge messages. Since only legitimate group
members with a related session key distributed can com-
prehend messages communicated by other group mem-
bers, forged messages will certainly be discarded.5.2 Simulation
To verify and explore our design, we have used three
powerful simulators including MATLAB, NS2, and
OPNET for evaluating the group establishing algorithm
and group key management. All of these simulators are
having lots of libraries for MANETs.5.2.1 Computational complexity and convergence analyses
for the group establishing algorithm
In this section, we mainly focus on estimating the com-
putational complexity and convergence for our group es-
tablishing algorithm. According to the algorithm, the
procedure of running through the six condition func-
tions continues if the value of Gi(i = 1,2,…, n) of certain
nodes is still changing. The immediate cause of changing
Gi is to meet the executive requirement of Test4() as de-
scribed in the previous section. Thus, the executive
times of Test4() can be used for estimating the computa-
tional complexity of our group establishing algorithm.
Theorem 1: There are n nodes randomly deployed in
a MANET region, and the value of maximum density
among all nodes is Δ. By means of our group establishing
algorithm, starting from an arbitrary illegitimate group
state, Test4() would be executed at most n(Δ + 1) times to
complete the grouping procedure.
Proof: When an arbitrary member Mi checks the six
test functions, if Mi ≠Gcon(i), through computing mGi
first, then Mi will execute Test4() to let Gi point to Gcon
(i). Similarly, if Mi =Gcon(i), Mi may also execute Test4()
to handle the invitation generated by neighbors of Mi
which have not satisfied group conditions. To sum up,
according to our algorithm, Mi will not execute Test4()
to change Gi again when all its neighbors Mj meet the
condition Mj =Gcon(j). Thus, in the worst case, Mi will
execute Test4() Δ times. There are n nodes in thenetwork; therefore, Test4() would be executed at most
n(Δ + 1) times to finish the grouping procedure.
Theorem 2: The group establishing algorithm con-
verges in O(Δ2n2) time steps
Proof: According to Function4(), if there are several
neighbors of Mi, including itself, they must execute the
group changing operation simultaneously, and the mem-
ber with the smallest ID number will execute the operation
first. Then the remaining members have to re-estimate the
variables mGi and Gcon(i) by running through the involved
condition functions. For Mi, the worst case is that the
member with the largest ID number which is ready to per-
form changing operation is Mi; thus, it will re-estimate
Gcon(i) Δ times. Between two consecutive executions, there
could be at most Δ time steps on Mi. Therefore, for all
MANETs, the group establishing algorithm converges in O
(Δ × n(Δ + 1) × n) =O(Δ2n2) time steps.
The above analyses can indicate that our group estab-
lishing algorithm meets the requirement of computa-
tional complexity and convergence for MANETs.
Next, to compare the grouping performance of our al-
gorithm with typical grouping algorithms commonly
known as MobHid [23], LLACA [14,25], and DLA-DC
[24], we have conducted the following experiments and
shown the simulation results as follows.
We first measure how the number of established
groups of each algorithm varies with the total number of
MANET members, which is represented as the index of
the average number of established groups. In another set
of experiments, we would conduct the simulation where
we estimate the average group establishing time for each
algorithm under different network densities, which can
be assessed as the sensitivity of the grouping algorithm.
With regard to node mobility, we conduct experiments
assuming the members are moving according to the ran-
dom waypoint (RW) model with random pause time in a
region of 1,000 × 1,000 m. The mobile speed for each
member is set to 5 to 20 m/s. The transmission range
for members is set to 100 and 200 m, respectively, for
comparison. To perform each algorithm in a strategic
mobile scenario, we set MANET members' mobile prob-
ability being proportional to their density (i.e., Prmobi ∝Den
ið Þ) computed by the equation Prmobi ¼ Den ið Þ=n , where n
denotes the number of MANET members. At each simu-
lation during the same parameter settings, we performed
500 rounds and recorded each involved index. The final
values in the following figures are the mean value of these
indexes.
From Figures 6 and 7, we can see that the increase in
transmission range of MANET members serves the pur-
pose to reduce the average number of established groups.
Take our method, for example, in a situation where the
network density stays at a low level (i.e., the number of
MANET members is less than 200), when the transmission
Figure 6 Comparison of average number of established groups (transmission range: 100 m).
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established groups has gone down from 10.85 to 4.2 with a
61.3% drop. Similarly, in a situation where the network
density stands at a relatively high level (i.e., the number of
MANET members ranges from 200 to 500), the same
index has gone down from 19.88 to 6.42 with a 67.7% drop.
We can also see that the average number of established
groups of each algorithm increases with different degrees
as the density of MANETs increases. For comparison, as
seen from Figure 6 showing the situation where the trans-
mission range is 100 m, when the number of MANET
members ranges from 50 to 500, the established group
number of MobHid increases on average from 19 to 48,
while the same index of LLACA and DLA-DC increases
from 13.1 and 12 to 38 and 32, respectively. On equal
terms, the average number of established groups of ourFigure 7 Comparison of average number of established groups (transmethod only increases from 8.6 to 23; in addition, when
the member number is less than 300, this growth is very
slow. All these trends exist in a situation where the trans-
mission range is 200 m as represented in Figure 7. Com-
pared with the other three schemes, our method has
significantly reduced the average number of established
groups so as to reduce the group maintenance and man-
agement overhead.
Figures 8 and 9 show the average group establishing
time of each algorithm under the two situations where the
members' transmission range is 100 and 200 m, respect-
ively. From these figures, we can find that adopting differ-
ent algorithms the average group establishing time raises
as the number of MANET members increases, and its
growth from large to small order is MobHid, DLA-DC,
LLACA, and our method. Because of maintaining andmission range: 200 m).
Figure 8 Comparison of average group establishing time (transmission range: 200 m).
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best of the four involved algorithms for the average group
establishing time. As we know, the average group estab-
lishing time can be evaluated as grouping efficiency and
algorithm sensitivity. In MANETs, the requirement of
self-organized information processing for mobile mem-
bers can be satisfied if the grouping procedure is finished
as quickly as possible; what is more, a sensitive grouping
algorithm can contribute to reduce the redundant infor-
mation generated by the group re-establishment proced-
ure caused by node mobility. So compared with the other
three schemes, our method plays the most significant role
to enhance the sensitivity and efficiency of the grouping
algorithm in the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs.Figure 9 Comparison of average group establishing time (transmissio5.2.2 Performance analyses for group key management in
the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs
Aiming at the group key management in strategic mo-
bile scenario of MANETs, our method can efficiently
realize the anonymous communication tolerating part of
members moving across multigroups. The mechanism of
our method is to build the mobile management model
to monitor the roaming nodes within the adjacency field
for the purpose of reducing the key updating frequency
and establishing latency.
Finally, we have designed several experiments to analyze
the performance of our key management protocol. In
addition, we implement the other two representative
group key management protocols of MANETs forn range: 200 m).
Table 2 The setting of secret thresholds used in Zhu's
scheme
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[15] and JHc's GDH3-based region key management
scheme [16,17], respectively. Similarly, we have employed
the RW model with the mobile probability following the
equation Prmobi ¼ Den ið Þ=n to simulate member's mobility
in strategic scenario. In this series of experiments, to
measure the impact of the different mobile speeds and
communication environments on each protocol, we run
the experiments under three mobile levels (5 to 10, 10
to 15, and 15 to 20 m/s, respectively) and four commu-
nication environments represented as link failure rate
(LFR; 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively). The other
parameters have set as follows: We set the number of
MANET members changing from 50 to 500. The trans-
mission range for each member is 100 m; the key size is
1,024 bits. At each simulation during the same param-
eter settings in Section 4.2.2 we performed it 500
rounds and recorded the following indexes. The final
values in each figure are the mean value of these in-
dexes. Note that each round was finished when 70% of
MANET members have exhausted their energy.
1. Average number of updates for group session key
(AUK)
2. Average number of group operations (ANO)
3. Average network lifetime (ANL)
For comparing the index AUK of each protocol
exactly, when terminating the grouping operation, we
set the core region (i.e., the group manager together
with its one-hop neighbors) of each group remaining
stationary just only to evaluate the update number of
the group session key by using the above different
protocols.
In Zhu's scheme, mobile nodes have been divided into
several hierarchy trees, similar to the groups of our proto-
col, according to the pre-set value of the regional trust co-
efficient (RTC) and global trust coefficient (GTC), where
the leaf parts of the tree are those real nodes and the rest
parts denote the virtual nodes responding to manage and
distribute the shared key. For a real node with sufficient
storages, it will store two kinds of public keys: (1) public
keys of itself and virtual nodes that are on its reverse path
to the root, which can be denoted by the group of all these
nodes, and (2) public keys of nodes within the same region
of any member of the group. Hence, according to this
scheme, for guaranteeing a highly secure environment
(i.e., the probability of node compromising and group
compromising is less than 5% and 0.01%, respectively),
we set different secret thresholds represented as k to-
wards different numbers of MANET members in our
experiment listed in Table 2.
In JHc's scheme, due to lack of a self-organized group-
ing mechanism we adopted the optimum region sets asthe group establishing parameters for a comparable ex-
periment of this part. More specifically, the field of
1,000 m × 1,000 m was zoned equally as 37 hexagon
groups geographically which can result in an efficient
trading inter-regional vs. intra-regional group key man-
agement overheads.
We have conducted simulation experiments of the
above algorithms. All experiment results are computed
on a DELL OptiPlex 360 Desktop PC with Intel Core™ 2
Duo 2.66-GHz E7300 processor and 2,048-MB RAM.
(Dell Inc., Round Rock, TX, USA). The series of experi-
ments to evaluate the AUK for each algorithm within
the network lifetime have been conducted, and the re-
sults are shown in Figure 10. We can find that in the
strategic mobile scenario of MANETs, the member's
mobile speed, the LFR and the network density would
affect the value of AUK. The first observation is that the
value of AUK of each algorithm rises as the LFR in-
creases. Because when the LFR increases, the probability
of members failing to communicate with each other, the
normal node being mistakenly detected to the malicious
node, and the network energy being quickly exhausted
caused by multiple message retransmission requests in-
evitably turns to be larger. For clarity, take Zhu's scheme
with the third level of member mobile speed (i.e., ML3)
for example, in a situation where the number of MA-
NET members is 300, when the network LFR stays at
5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively, the value of AUK is
48.6, 50, 71.9, and 78.4. The second observation is that
when fixing the LFR, the value of AUK of each algo-
rithm turns to decline, to some extent, as the network
density increases. The reason is that a high network
density stands for a large probability of network tending
to be stable. Hence, in MANETs with a high density, the
updates led by topology changes are no longer in a dom-
inant position compared to those by periodical updates.
Under such circumstances the value of AUK of each




Figure 10 Comparison of AUK. Link failure rates: (a) 5%, (b) 10%, (c) 15%, (d) 20%.
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Tupdate × ALF. The third observation is that when the
network member number and the LFR are under the
same condition, the value of AUK of each algorithm
turns to increase as ML upgrades. For example, when
member number is 400 and the LFR is 20%, in a situ-
ation where the mobile level of members in the network
are set to be ML1, ML2, and ML3, the value of AUK is
24, 26, and 29, respectively. To sum up, compared with
the other two algorithms, our method can effectively re-
duce the value of AUK (i.e., reduce the key updating
overhead) and tolerate part of failure of communication
as well as high speed mobility of network members,
which results in an improvement of the real-time and
secure indexes.
Figure 11 shows the result of the ANO for each algo-
rithm within the network lifetime under various experi-
ment conditions. In these experiments, the group
operation consists of three behaviors including group
merging, group partition, and re-grouping. More specif-
ically, in Zhu's scheme, all three behaviors were defined
and handled by designed procedures. In JHc's scheme,
group merging and group partition are the main forms
of the group operation, while in our method, the re-
grouping operation is the only involved way to the groupoperation. Because the group operation is the most
resource-intensive behavior for group key management
protocol, measuring the value of ANO of each algorithm
can exactly assess their communication, computation,
and storage overhead. From Figure 11, we can find that
first, under the same LFR, the value of ANO of each al-
gorithm rises with a slight fluctuation as the network
density increases. Second, under the same situation of
network density, the value of ANO of each algorithm
rises as the mobile level of nodes upgrades from ML1 to
ML3. Third, under the same mobile level together with
the network situation, the value of ANO of each algo-
rithm rises as the LFR ranges from 5% to 20%. To sum
up, compared with the other two schemes, our method
could reduce the value of ANO always being the lower
level, which reflected that our group key management
protocol can effectively save the communication, com-
putation, and storage overhead in the strategic mobile
scenario of MANETs.
Finally, we ran the experiments to measure the ANL
of each algorithm under different conditions of network
density and LFR. Note that in these series of experiments,
the mobile speed of MANET members is set to be 5 to
20 m/s. From Figure 12, we can see that as the LFR in-
creases, under the same condition of network density, the
Figure 12 Comparison of ANL.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 11 Comparison of ANO. Link failure rates: (a) 5%, (b) 10%, (c) 15%, (d) 20%.
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different degrees. The reason is that due to a higher LFR,
the probability of message retransmission turns to be lar-
ger which can result in a rapid exhaustion of members'
energy. Take JHc's scheme for example, when the number
of MANET members is 400, in a situation where the LFR
is 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively, the value of ANL
is 394, 371, 297, and 176 s, which presents a decline ten-
dency. In addition, as the scale of the network enlarges
(i.e., the network density increases) under the same con-
ditions, the value of ANL of each algorithm declines
with different degrees. For example, when LFR is 10%,
the value of ANL in Zhu's scheme has gone down from
584 to 290 with a 50.3% drop. The same index in JHc's
scheme has gone down from 585 to 246 with a 57.9%
drop, while that in our method has gone down from 600
to 430 with a mere 28.3% drop. Hence, compared with
the other two schemes, not only in terms of absolute
value but also the relative value for the decline, our
method shows the best performance to prolong the net-
work lifetime. What is more, the experiment results can
also demonstrate that when the network member num-
ber increases from 50 to 500, the lowest drop of ANL in
our method can satisfy the requirement of MANET
scalability which plays an important role to prolong the
network lifetime.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an energy-efficient group
key management protocol for the strategic mobile sce-
nario of MANETs. It mainly depends on the three pro-
posed mechanisms to address the problem of enhancing
energy-efficient security and scalability performance for
the protocol handling key establishment and distribution
in the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs. Both theoret-
ical analyses and simulation experiments have demon-
strated that our protocol is more scalable to the strategy
mobile application scenario of MANETs with a large num-
ber of users and enables energy-efficient security without
increasing computation and communication overhead. In
contrast, we have distinguished typical grouping methods
from a performance point of view and shown that our
group establishing algorithm is the best to satisfy the re-
quirement of computational complexity and convergence
for MANETs. We also have compared our key manage-
ment protocol with other three schemes and indicated
that our method performed best that can meet the scal-
ability requirement which plays an important role in
prolonging the network lifetime and effectively save the
communication, computation, and storage overhead in
the strategic mobile scenario of MANETs.
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